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Twin Peaks as Islamic Process Metaphysics

By Richard Marshall.

‘I feel like I’m somewhere else. Have you ever felt like that Charlie?’ – Audrey Horne: Twin Peaks, Series 3.

Does the successful identity thief become, by definition, her own victim?

The show’s piloting consciousness steers bright dark religious-type negotiations into hell. Formerly embraced and humanized archaic forces plus energies of indistinct feeling converse in simple, profound terms. They are struggling with elemental, chaotic images that are continually becoming more primitive. It has become a place of demons. All we register is a prophetic absence, the emptiness, loneliness, vastness, meaningless of signals . ‘If we do manage to catch a glimpse of our inner selves by some contraption of mirrors we recognise it with horror – it is an animal crawling and decomposing in hell…In the last decade or two the imprisonment of the camera lens has begun to crack. The demonized state of our inner world has made itself felt in a million ways.’ Ted Hughes knew that a persons’ inner state can’t fold up its spiritual wings just because ideology requires it to.

Lynch’s work procedes by a unique collection of shadowy figures in a strange visionary atmosphere. They seem like mythical figures living in a mythical world dreaming mythical dreams, strangely supernatural full of conflict and authority and unearthly states – they are the equivalent of the Platonic myths from Africa via Egypt via Persia and the Middle East and all the shores of the Mediterranean. There is a voltage to the storytelling sending pictures that you can’t help feeling. It hits you hard. It’s like a gigantic system. It magnetises your consciousness and reception into a special pattern. It is floating and shining as though we have been drawn into a constellation that’s all tangled and detonating, warping like a psychological depth charge. We get huge charges of material reality stretched to limits of visibility and comprehensibility. What is stretched is our dormant understanding of visibility, of pictures, and also our understanding of good and evil and what lies beyond both – both seeing and good and evil. Many assumptions reassess themselves in all this. Intuitions and roused anecdotes declare themselves and explain themselves. There are obviously degrees of it.

Each scene is a little factory of irreducible detail wielding a story. Each one is like a somnambulant fumbling with ancient stories that are never exhausted. They carry their own implications. They are pictures dedicated to final realities that are not pictures. Each picture stops us dead in our tracks. They demand sacrifices we wouldn’t otherwise have conceived. There is a delicate wiring of imagination that needs tuning in to understand that the outer world is only one of the world’s we live in. There are worlds we know which are indescribable, impenetrable and invisible. Now and again we are introduced to psychic, spiritual, cosmic, comic, horrific worlds. In these worlds everything is relativised so we can’t be sure if what we’re experiencing is miniaturized or magnified. We are concerned largely with the individual consciousness behind the face, focused on details and distinctions.

Does the history of art have a narrative structure? Panofsky says no. Art is simply the working out of symbolic forms until some internal upheaval gives rise to new ones. Hegel says yes, that the narrative is one of a process becoming self- conscious, but also no, because changes in symbolic forms are internal. They are realms of freedom no longer subject to any iron law of development and transformation. There is a progression but this development lays down seeds and these are revolutionary seeds. Each seed is a trauma. Arthur C Danto writes: ‘ … with the trauma to its own theory of itself, painting had to discover, or try to discover, what its true identity was. With the trauma, it entered onto a new level of self-awareness.’

Artistic, prophetic, expiatory madness, and the madness of the lover in seeds. Sometimes a seed is an egg. The mesmerized moment of an egg breaking open is where object, self and symbol flow out into a stream of consciousness. It is a flying amphibious bug crawling in through the mouth down a throat. Thomas Browne writes of this image in ‘Religio Medici’; he writes of it as ‘…that great and true Amphibian whose nature is disposed to live, not only like other creatures in diverse elements, but in divided and distinguished worlds.’ It is impinging vision or poetic actuality, a range of weird phenomena of dislocation and psychic disease. The lineaments of pure psychic fright. Edwin Muir writes this: ‘… what we are not and can never be, our fable, seems to me inconceivably interesting.’ Spontaneous, ineffable, psychic generation of unconscious psychic drives and inhibitions relinquishes abstraction and objects for quality of feeling, symbolic form and art. Works of art are pictures of the inner world of feelings – emotions, intuitions, judgments and values. This is imprecise. A cliché image itself. Inner and outer tend to be difficult terms. Music concerns time. It by-passes problems of representation. Nevertheless image-making is at the heart of our biological nature. We refine our natures within the unconscious image-making forces. Individual consciousness elaborates developing and recreating images. James Hillman says: ‘ What we do within the imagination is of instinctual significance.’

David Lynch works with this sensibility. Goethe wrote of Kant: ‘What is omitted … is the imagination and that omission strikes me as irreversibly disastrous. Imagination is the fourth faculty in addition to the Sense, the Understanding and Reason.’

‘Twin Peaks’ shows only part of the world, but the one that is usually hidden, or only partly given. There are image making energies grasp different categories, each with their laws, procedures and character. There are debts to Coleridge and Blake. The notion of incomplete souls and transmigration fused with bodily resurrectionist metaphysics is shimmering darkly all the way through. Yet we also see a metaphysical repertoire that includes at least three views: firstly that when death strikes for some the soul is separated from the body; secondly that there’s an eternal cycle of transmigration involving an infinite process of reincarnation to human and subhuman bodies; and thirdly the perfect and intermediately perfect are disembodied and the deficient undergo transmigration for the purpose of purification. In this there are interesting though imperfect links with the Islamic philosophy of Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa’i. A religious sensibility and an artistic one are closely aligned because they are both obscure diverse forms of knowing attending our illuminated everyday experiences. Of the ethical, the mythical and the scientific Cardinal Newman writes: ‘… they complete, correct, balance each other.’ Lynch’s art cultivates the artistic: he disturbs us into mythical, symbolic, artistic awareness.

For Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa’i his third view, that regarding the transmigration of souls, takes two forms. Souls are initially attached to the lowest forms of bodies – atoms, minerals and plants and gradually ascend to human bodies and if perfected as humans leave their corporeal state to reach the lowest sphere of Paradise. The second form is more in line with thinkers as diverse as Empodocles, Pythagorus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Budhasaf, and the Egyptians Agathodaemon and Hermes. Subhuman bodies only receive souls from humans. Animal souls that reach perfection escape corporeality when their animal bodies die. The Buddha thinks that a human soul can only transmigrate to animals whereas the others think it can move to subanimal forms. There is some evidence that Lynch disagrees with the Buddha on this. The One Armed Spirit Man’s arm has transmigrated into a weird skeletal tree which in turn has an evil doppelganger that attacks Cooper in the Episode ‘The Stars Turn and a Time Presents Itself.’

When we see a bug/frog-like creature hatching from an egg, entering an unconscious girl’s room and climbing into her mouth and down her throat we drift through an inner world of spontaneous fantasy, mood and half-conscious monologue. We struggle to think rationally about so many issues. Dream images have strange and elusive meanings. Lynch seems to show human souls escape when they reach perfection to the World of Light. The intermediate in happiness ascend to the World of Suspended Images. The duration of transubstantiation depends on the quantity of evil traits of a respective soul. A purified soul enters the lower region of the World of suspended images. Souls that fail to be purified aren’t attached to subhuman entities forever but become separated from bodies and ascend into the World of Images where they become attached to shadows of suspended forms. There are specific suspended images referenced – in a video essay from VoorDeFilm we see pictures by Francis Bacon – ’Seated Figure’, ‘Portrait of a Man’ and ‘Two Figures at a Window’ ; Rene Magritte’s “Meditation’; Stan Kubrick; Arnold Bocklin’s ‘Isle of the Dead’, Edward Hopper’s ‘Office at Night’, ‘Gas’, ‘Summer Evening’ and ‘New York Movie’.

Imperfect human souls are transferred at death into animal bodies corresponding to moral traits. The process of purification progresses them into increasingly noble animals until they are ready for the lower realms of paradise. Unsuccessful souls are transferred to animal bodies in the World of Images. Lynch is also committed to resurrection within the material world. There are two kinds, one in a minor key and the other in a major one. The minor resurrection consists in the disembodiment of a particular soul. The major resurrection consists of the eventual restoration of the material world following a prior annihilation.

In the background lies some theory of both the unity of being and divine unity. We find existential unity at the top level and unity of divine attributes at a lower level. The lowest level denies a plurality of divinity. Existential unity is identified with a sense of an absolute, unlimited and exclusive reality, a kind of divine essence devoid of multiplicity. Just below this level is the level where the plurality of divine attributes points both to the unity of this sense of divine and the multiplicity of what the divine creates, the loci in which the divine is manifested. We struggle to live where all this intersects.

A key question is what the relationship is between any created being and this sense of divine being. One answer is that it is analogous. The divine being is uncreated and eternal, known and understood only by itself. So anything attributed to created beings cannot be like that and we are only analogously beings when thought of in terms of the ultimate and only true one. The Islamic theologian Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa’i, according to Sabine Schmidtke, rejects this analogous view of being. Rather, the attributes of created beings are archetypes that are real in the divine’s knowledge. They are identical with the divine and have being irrespective of whether they exist in the external world or not. As they come into being in the external world they are manifestations of the absolute being. He develops a mystical notion such that the divine attributes are identical with the essence of the divine. He uses his notion of different levels of unity to show that at the lower level the attributes are part of what is in the world of appearance. Once ascended to the highest level of unity, all attributes disappear.

Souls have perfect bodies that have organs as a result of which they are capable of nourishment and growth, sensation and voluntary motion, that can conceive universals and discovery. The various manifestations of Dougie and Cooper’s Double and others exhibit this. They help reveal some deep preconceptual sources of our imagination. Souls of celestial spheres are different. These are not natural phenomena because it is via others that knowledge is transmitted about them. What is not known is greater than what is. But even if not natural, they are physical in Lynch. What we have then is the weird physicality of art making. Werner Herzog wrote about this once when reflecting about his film ‘The Great Ecstasy of Woodcarver Steiner’: ‘ Everything was working out well enough: the endless technical problems were solved; but still for me , the film wasn’t clear. Then one night the film crew, myself, and some others grabbed the skier, hoisted him on our shoulders and ran with him through the streets. His thigh was on my shoulder and I could feel the weight of him there. At that moment, the film suddenly became quite clear for me. And it came through this physical sensation. I feel everything about the films I make physically. I like to carry the reels around and feel their weight. When we are shooting I sometimes even like to touch the film itself.’ And there is also that ‘… latent feeling of fellowship with all creation – and to the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts’ that Joseph Conrad writes about, those formless hunches that console, frighten and charm.

Switching momentarily to Christian symbolic myth, Anselm notoriously argued that just one thing was a necessary existent. He argued that there had to be an uncaused cause and there could only be one and it would have to be necessary. If uncaused it would be both ineffable and transcendent. He required that everything about this first cause would also be necessary. If it had contingent features these would require a further cause would be needed as their explicandum. He concludes that the universe necessarily exists via necessity through another, and that its knowledge involves no change or passivity. What the first cause knows is known in a universal way and self reflectively.

‘You are so much one and the same with yourself that in nothing are you dissimilar with yourself. Indeed, you are unity itself not divisible by any mind. Life and wisdom and other attributes, then, are not parts of you, but all are one and each of them is wholly what you are and what all the others are.’ (Proslogion: 18, DE 98)

What makes the argument powerful is not a logical point but an aesthetic one. It is a shadowing aesthetic harmony that is driving the argument . In the divine there can be no discord but instead perfect harmony.

‘Thus when a painter plans beforehand what he is going to execute, he has the picture in his mind, but he does not yet think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However, when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands that it exists because he has now made it.’ (Proslogion 2, DE 87)

And then comes an experience which Walter Pater described as ‘… this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off – that continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves … for our one chance lies in … getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time … For art comes to you professing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moment’s sake.’

Anselm says that our souls will be ‘dazzled’ by a spendour and ‘overcome by its fullness, overwhelmed by it immensity, confused by its extent.’ When the light is withdrawn the soul… ‘looks all about, and does not see your beauty. It listens and does not hear your harmony. It smells and doesn’t sense your fragrance. It tastes and doesn’t recognize your savour. It feels and doesn’t feel your softness.’ (17, DE 97). Lynch’s dark scenes are his version of this, the woodsmen, the gas station and so on work like solitary impressions, unstable, flickering and inconstant where their whole beings are dwarfed to the narrow chamber of an individual’s mind, cut from art and culture, its cultural and biological sources.

Anselm and Calvin’s redemption through penal substitution also plays a role in Lynch’s symbolism. Christ pays the price for human sin and the price is horrible suffering, a total alienation from God, an alienation that extends beyond Good Friday into Holy Saturday. Calvin says the descent into hell in the Apostle’s Creed is a reference to the descent into the deepest abyss, the furthest distance from God. Grunewald’s Isenheim Alterpiece is a medieval precedent of the cold twisted mental architecture of Evil Bob. Yet what was delivered in all this is an aesthetic balance of the world. Humans couldn’t by themselves pay back what was owed to God because they owed their existence. Only the Son of God could give back something that wasn’t owed by him. Christ’s death was in no sense owed.

The restoration will be aesthetic and done in terms of righting infelicities in resulting descriptions of relationships. Eg ‘… if it is to be the Father who is made incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity because, through his assumption of manhood, the father will be grandson of the parents of the Virgin, and the Word, despite having no trace of human nature in him, will none the less be the grandson of the Virgin, because he will be the son of her son.’ The number of the saved will be determined by the number of fallen angels. What will guide this will be the identification of a ‘perfect number’ foreknown by God but unknown by anyone else, determined by aesthetic reasons. In Lynch what guides us through the myriad scenes, events and character formations is an underlying or overarching sense of beauty. ‘The beautiful’ is one of Lynch’s most enduring aims.

Nowhere in the Christian mythos do we need to wonder if there’s a difference in an eternal context between ‘begetting’ and ‘ proceeding’ … ‘only the father is one who is from no one; only the son is one who is from one; only the spirit is one from whom no one is.’ This is a beautiful thing. It should not be confused as rationality. Some folk have problems with art thinking just as they do with religious thinking. They say if it isn’t rational then it isn’t thinking. Obviously this is a psychotic and sociopathic vision. Without the cultivated inner life there is just a dark blind box and noises.

Just as Anslem never declares that Christ’s suffering is beautiful: ‘… it was rather key aspects of the event that were beautiful and which helped determine the divine choice, such as the wood of the cross balancing the tree of the Fall…’ (David Brown) neither does Lynch say that the violence in itself in his works is beautiful. But just as without the suffering of Christ the Christian image would be less beautiful, so too the overarching beauty of Lynch’s world would be severely artistically diminished without it’s violence, terror and horror.

Each scene Lynch gives is part of a gathering up into a harmonious whole – even where that harmony contains a vast and frighteningly overwhelming inferno within the camera lens. ‘The vessels thus filled with You do not render You any support: for though they perished utterly, You would not be spilt out. And in pouring Yourself out upon us, You do not come down to us but rather elevate us to You: You are not scattered over us, but we are gathered into one by You.’ (Augustine Confessions Book 1, III)

In this sort of aesthetical approach, metaphysics becomes a kind of metaceramics. Characters and individuals become jugs of life, clay heads of the dead out of Hieronymous Bosch’s ‘The Garden of Earthly Delights’, couples in a bubble… life as amniotic sac escape routines left out to dry in a Francis Bacon picture somewhere. An ontological doctrine of creationism says fictional objects exist as abstracts and do so as a result of being created. Some say that whether or not there are any fictional characters, if there are any then their identity and distinctness is brute. Others argue that they are concrete but don’t exist. Others again argue that they exist but aren’t concrete. Brute identity says that there isn’t a true finitely stated informative answer to the question of identity. The question of identity asks, for example of Agent Cooper and Bad Cooper; What necessary and sufficient conditions must they both satisfy for it not to be the case that Agent Cooper is identical to Bad Cooper?

But the whole of Twin Peaks is revealed at the end to be the dream of the dead man in Laura Palmer’s house in the final episode, just as the whole of ‘Mulholland Drive’ is also a corpse dream. Of course, this elaborate, extremist homage to ‘Sunset Boulevard’ is just another way of showing the balance of power between the inner and the outer world, revealing again and again the immense haunted gulf that lies between them.

It makes sense to think about Lynch as a kind of Peter Simons-like Process Metaphysician. Lynch-world is a dream. The Process Metaphysician is not interested in linguistic meanings. Language gives clues but doesn’t cut nature at the joints. Linguistic clues instead freely invite ‘the confused mass of thoughts, trembling over one another in the dark’ into consciousness. Process Metaphysics is a diffuse version of Christian Wolf’s regional ontology and formal systematics where everything is naturalistically in space and time. There’s no magic, nor many worlds, nor Platonic Universals, nor magical beings as such but yet there’s more than any hollow receptacle or terminal station. And there is also a profound realization that you can’t say everything in the language of physics. It denies physicalism that often gets erroneously co-opted into a naturalistic worldview. There’s an austere Nominalism in play. Lynch doesn’t give us abstracts even though there may be Aristotelian universals, especially via the songs. He connects language and world via an exotic trance-like truth-making where objects, by virtue of existing, make things true. Systematics is the investigation in the whole panoply of life and how it all fits together.

Substances exist for Lynch but they aren’t the building blocks of his reality. Processes are anything that exists in time and space. Philosophers like Nietzsche, Whitehead, Carnap and Russell treat their fundamental entities as processes. So too Lynch. Substances are involved but processes are fundamental because the truthmakers are processes not substances. Existential propositions are true because the object said to exist exists. “Bob exists’ is made true by the existence of Bob. That’s the basic form of singular existential propositions. But we don’t just say Bob exists but we say that Bob exists at a certain time.

We want to know, in Lynch world, when Bob exists is true. What necessitates the existence of Bob is not the existence of Bob but some time segment of his vital processes that necessitates the connection. The dream process exists of necessity. And it follows then that, if true, Bob’s existence is necessary by dint of the time segment of the whole process wherein he exists. These are the existing vital processes that necessarily Bob is dependent on. So what needs examining is a time segment of that process. And this in turn provides us with a necessary not contingent truth maker.

Back in 1925 Whitehead started his response to Zeno. Atomic events had to be atomic and creatures had to be atomic but the spatial temporal volume in which these things exist is not atomic. This mismatch is a curious source. Lynch shows this as a time slice in New Mexico and the first testing of a nuclear explosive device. It involves a relational idea that everything in the world is a kind of experience. And that maybe everything has experiences . It’s a spare species of panpsychism that throws out heinous monstrousness from atomic cataclysm in New Mexican deserts in the 1950’s. Intentionality and experience apply to everything even at the most fundamental level. Evil Bob is born then. The internal genetic division of an entity is an occurring in time. This captures Lynch’s dream ontology of time as well as space being spread out but in a rather odd way. The beautiful music occurring in the Roadhouse in each episode also makes sense of this, where we note the relational link between music and time. Music structures time as beauty.

If processes are fundamental then this affects the sorts of categories we can apply to Lynch. Do categories divide the world or not? The world divides up differently from the way language and concepts divide it up. Kant thinks categories just structure our thoughts to use against the outside mush. Categories can structure reality and others can structure our thoughts. Aristotelian categories divide nature. Kant’s categories involve negation, disjunction, necessity etc and these are not about nature but about our own judgments. So we have a mix of categories. Kant’s are there because we can’t know the world as it is. So we use concepts to help us in our ignorance. Negation is a Kantian category that isn’t needed by God but because we have ignorance it’s useful to have it. It’s the same with disjunction. They are logical constants that Wittgenstein made clear are not real. They are because we don’t know and they cover up our ignorance. Existence is another one. Hume and Brentano and Kant are right that the verb exist exists to deal with our ignorance. Abstraction is a cognitive operation for the same reason too. The vast categories of religion and art can understand imagination better than these.

On the other side there are categories about the natural world. Aristotle and Frege, for example, work up these. Things, properties, relations and states of affairs are common to current ontology – the philosopher DM Armstrong is probably the key figure – but all this thinking is based on linguistic use and so is dependent on a linguistic turn in philosophy that Lynch resists. Keith Campbell thinks there is only one category – tropes. Others say there are two – tropes plus the substances on which they depend. What differentiates the categories? A Brute answer just says ‘they’re different!’ Even if correct, it’s annoyingly brief. We want to be able to say more about the relationship. ‘Factors’ help take this to rock bottom. We get a closed island of concepts that ends up with undefinability. The very idea of ‘cause’ seems to be like this, for example. ‘Factors’ is the work you do to differentiate one category from another until you can go no further.

‘Factors Ontology’ is the sort of thing we associate, for example, with Empedocles and his four fundamental elements. The elements are the way they are for two factors (hence it’s a ‘factors’ ontology) – the ‘temperature factor’ and the ‘humidity factor’. Hot-cold, wet-dry. There cannot be anything wet without something being wet. They are actual by virtue of their elements. Whitehead says this too. There’s a dependence factor and there’s a predictability factor – things said of something or not said of something – and we end with four different kinds things. If you look hard in Aristotle we find factors there too. Brentano found seven factors for Aristotelian categories and concluded that Aristotle didn’t just throw them out but they were a result of factorization. And they’re independent of language. Much of Islamic theology is a factored ontology. Anselm’s too.

When Polish philosopher Roman Witold Ingarden wrote ‘The Controversy Over the Existence of the World,’ he worked out a factored ontology in which he anatomised what there is into existential moments that oddly coincided with the sacred ontologies of Aristotle, Avicenna and the scholastics. Any discreet factored ontology ends up with a digital matrix of possible combinations which remain finite because there are finite factors. It allows you to say whether there is dependence and of what order of dependence this is. Dependence is relational and how many orders of relational dependence there are depends on the number of factors – part/whole, location/quantity, determination/causation etc.

So now where does all this leave us when asking what the powers, causation and structures are in Lynch. Start with causation. What causes what in Lynch? The species of causation is where by nature of it happening necessarily brings about something else. There is more than one species of this: there is statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. There is non-deterministic causality. Lynch knows causality is but one species of happening. When something is causal it is like this, but there are things that happen that are not causal. There are, for example, spontaneous happenings where things just happen. Nothing about causality says that everything that happens has to be caused. Lynch’s dream world has some causal events but also shows us things just happening.

There are strange powers in Lynch. Powers are standardly things that happen through time without parts. As a process ontologist this can’t be right for Lynch. Power needs to be translated into actual or possible processes. Potentiality is difficult. Can potentiality have a place in the unfolding of processes? It’s going to be like the converse of causality. There are open questions that follow such as: What is the status of powers waiting to be activated? There are different stories for this. Are all properties dispositional? A process account needs to be able to do this. Contingency and the realization of powers has to deal with coincidence, whereby feebly connected causal chains become involved. Coincidence happens a lot in Lynch. How to explain?

Contingency attaches to things like you and me. There seems less room for contingency in process ontologies than in substance ontologies. Things aren’t bound to occur. Processes can be shunted into a different way of going on by something else. For example we see bad coincidence happening in the scene where the little boy crossing the road is killed by Richard. To understand how this is possible we need to understand the relationship between process and contingency. The identity of a process is partly causal. Vital processes can cause the process to keep going, as the eating of cherry pie and drinking coffee keeps Agent Cooper going. But not all causation is like that. A shooting incident is a dissipative event. It doesn’t sustain the previous identity process, as in the stake-out shooting which destroys the stake-out, even though it is causal. Personal order invariance in Whitehead shows that properties are not the same at the end as they were at the start. There is an adjustment as we move from the invariant to the properties of the invariant. Powers and contingencies out of processes need a theory explaining why continuancies are more easily explained than the particulars continuing.

Structure is difficult. Processes have structure. Dreams have structure. Symbolic orders have structure. Films, pictures, music, dance, ritual, religions, myths have structure. There’s a structure to the process and to the continuance. But it isn’t just part and whole. Structuralism says it’s relations all the way down. This strikes the process ontologist as incoherent. Surely there have to be things that relate. So they need a basic unit. So what is the basic unit for process ontology? Units are mass multiplied by time. Mass is equivalent to energy. Two variants of same thing. Energy is defined in terms of Mass, but if you decide to reverse this then Energy now becomes the fundamental. Energy multiplied by time is given in joules. There is a physical thing that is measured by this . It’s action. Action is the dimension or quantity of one of the fundamental constants of the universe.

So ‘Twin Peaks’ is a process ontology or metaphysics. Like Billy Wilder’s ‘Sunset Boulevard’ the process is a dead self dreaming where, as Yeats wrote,‘…like a long-legged fly upon the stream/His mind moves upon silence’.


Richard Marshall is still biding his time.

Buy his new book here or his first book here to keep him biding!

End Times Series: the first 302

First published in 3:AM Magazine: Saturday, March 3rd, 2018.